Crisis Communication Characteristics & Errors: A Case Study by Pasquier, Martial & Fivat, Etienne
  Vol 2, No. 1, 2012 




Crisis communication characteristics and 
errors: A case study 
  
Martial Pasquier 
Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), Lausanne 
 
Etienne Fivat 
Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), Lausanne 
 
In 2006, events surrounding the University of Geneva led to the resignation of its 
executive board, and a political reform of the institution. This case constitutes a typical 
example of where a crisis is strengthened, and even created, by inappropriate 
information-management. Such situations, in which material damages and personal harm 
are generally quite limited, are increasingly frequent and have a particularly important 
impact on public trust in political and administrative institutions. The main aim of this 
paper is to identify the characteristics of this type of crisis, and errors linked to it from a 
media-communications perspective. This will be done through an analysis of publications 
in four different newspapers, as well as of official documents and statements from the 




On April 9, 2006, the Sunday paper Le Matin Dimanche published an article entitled, 
“Scandale à l’Uni: des profs menaient la grande vie aux frais de l’Etat” (Scandal at the 
University: profs living lavishly at the state’s expense), in which it revealed the contents of an 
audit report on the University of Geneva conducted by the financial inspection agency of the 
state of Geneva. This article sparked a crisis lasting several months that led to the resignation 
of all members of the executive board of the university1
 
 and to a reform of the university by 
political authorities. 
While crisis management and communication related to catastrophes, accidents or major 
incidents have been the subject of numerous studies, – i.e. situations in which it is necessary 
to manage the crisis on the one hand and the communication concerning the crisis on the 
other – the interest in crises more inherently linked to the disclosure and management of 
information (in which the crisis is strengthened – or even created – by inappropriate 
communication) has been limited until now. This type of situation, in which physical damage 
and personal harm are generally quite limited, is increasingly frequent2 and has a significant 
impact on public trust in political and administrative institutions.3
 
 
This paper does not aim to examine the institutional or organisational causes and issues or the 
actions of the various people involved in this particular crisis. Rather, its objective is to 
identify the characteristics of and errors linked to this type of crisis from a media-
communication perspective – thus focusing on the type of external perspective that people 
may have, in order to develop strategies and tools that will make it possible to manage crises 
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in such a way as to avoid harming the reputation of the institutions or organisations involved 
(Barton, 2001; Coombs, 2007a; Coombs, 2010). As Pearson and Mitroff (1993) and Sturges 
(1994) suggest, one of the primary objectives of crisis management is to maintain an 
organisation’s image – i.e. the public perception of the organisation (Coombs, 1995). 
 
After briefly summarising the literature on crisis communication (part 1) and outlining the 
methodology of this study (part 2), this article outlines the various phases of the University of 
Geneva crisis (part 3), analyses the characteristics of the crisis (part 4) and the errors 
committed (part 5) and concludes with the lessons to be learned from the crisis (part 6). 
 
1. Crisis management and communication 
 
A crisis is defined by Crozier (1991) as the “change in all parameters of the physical and 
human environment in such a way that points of reference no longer exist and people no 
longer know how to behave” [translation]. A crisis is therefore characterised by a breakdown 
in normal functioning and leads to strong feelings of uncertainty to which it is difficult to find 
answers. However, a crisis is perceptual: “It is the perception of stakeholders that help to 
define an event as a crisis” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 3). From a more analytical perspective, an 
organisational crisis can be defined by different characteristics (see Coombs, 2007b; 2010; 
Fearn-Banks, 2007; Zaremba, 2010). The crisis affects the organisation as a whole, not just 
parts of it, including the following factors:  
 
• The causes may be known, but they cannot be predicted and take the organisation by 
surprise, i.e., “[a] crisis is unpredictable but not unexpected” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 3); 
• The consequences put the organisation’s survival at stake; 
• Both within the organisation and outside of it, people’s perceptions override the facts; 
• Requests for information and explanations go beyond the nucleus of those who are 
directly concerned and there is a strong external pressure on the organisation from all 
stakeholders.  
 
While the crisis itself requires professional management to identify appropriate technical 
solutions (provide aid, help individuals in difficulty, identify and find a solution to a technical 
failure, etc.) and restore things to their normal, pre-crisis way of functioning, the 
communications surrounding the crisis take on a particular scope and extend beyond the 
crisis itself, both in terms of time and of the people involved. According to most authors, 
good crisis management requires good communication (see Anthonissen, 2008; Coombs, 
2007a; Fearn-Banks, 2007; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Ulmer et al., 2007; 2009). Thus, “[a] 
crisis compels organizations to communicate with various audiences in order to limit the 
damages that may be caused by a crisis. The quality of these communications can ameliorate 
or exacerbate the situation” (Zaremba, 2010, p. 21). Similarly, John Penrose (2000) 
emphasises that without appropriate communication, a crisis management plan is useless. 
 
The evolution of crisis communication is closely related to that of media and technology and 
to their liberation from political control. Crisis communication gained in importance as early 
as the 1960s and 70s and, with the development of continuous and simultaneous information 
(the Internet), coupled with strong competition within the media basically became essential 
for any organisation facing even minor crises. 
 
According to Revéret and Moreau (1997) and Libaert (2001), a number of elements 
underscore the importance of using appropriate communication in crisis situations including 
the following.  
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• Many members of the population are directly concerned because they or people to whom 
they are close are involved. They may also feel concerned because certain values or basic 
rules have been violated. In these types of situations, people feel that they have a 
legitimate right to obtain information and answers. Crises are likely to touch an 
increasingly large percentage of people, given the context of globalisation, the fact that 
exchanges are not only economic but also social and cultural, and the speed at which 
communication travels. 
• Many different players become involved, providing their own interpretations of events 
and their own visions of what should be done. Whether from a professional or political 
perspective, many people who would not normally express their views about the 
organisation are likely to take advantage of the crisis to get media coverage (as experts, to 
defend values and propose general solutions, to increase their own visibility or that of 
their organisation, etc.). 
• The organisation’s reputation and its role in society are very important when it comes to 
crises and crisis communication. On the one hand crises damage reputation and such 
changes can affect how stakeholders interact with the organization (Barton, 2001; 
Coombs, 2010; Dowling, 2002). However, on the other hand – and regardless of whether 
an organisation’s reputation is good or bad – the higher the notoriety of the organisation 
the more likely it is that media and the population in general will follow the story. 
• The pace of communication concerning the crisis also plays a significant role. While the 
pace of crisis management tends to be determined by the circumstances of the crisis itself 
(accident, pollution, technical failure, etc.), crisis communication is largely determined 
from outside the organisation by the pace of media coverage and of the other main 
players involved.  
• The organisation’s traditional channels of communication rapidly become saturated. 
These channels are accustomed to responding to “normal” media attention, but not to high 
volume, continuous (day and night, weekends), and insistent demands, particularly since 
these channels often have no information to provide to the media.  
• The organisation must provide specific and quick responses. As Leonard Saffir and John 
Tarrant (1996) have emphasised, the timing of a response to a crisis is critical. Although 
it is often difficult to determine the exact cause of an accident or incident, the 
organisation must provide whatever information it has at its disposal and be particularly 
careful not to give the impression that it is hiding information. This is because “[t]he 
media and the public may suspect that the company is trying to cover up something or 
that it simply does not care” (in Horsley & Barker, 2002, p. 409). Lack of information 
from a company spokesperson also leads to rumours and speculation, which can have a 
lasting negative impact on a company (Horsley & Barker, 2002; Seigenthaler et al., 2008; 
Xenou & Sánchez, 2008). It is obviously important, however, to only provide information 
that has been verified and validated and to avoid at all costs advancing any hypotheses 
which may be taken for fact and then later invalidated. 
 
Communication will fundamentally shape public perception of the crisis and the organisation 
involved in the crisis (Russ, 1991). Information that is regular, accurate, complete, and, if 
possible, personalised (i.e., provided by one person speaking on behalf of the organisation) 
makes it possible to reduce uncertainty, limit the risk of too many external players becoming 
involved, and avoid damage to the organisation’s reputation and the population’s trust in it 
(Coombs, 2007a; Hoggan, 1991; Lerbinger, 1986; White & Mazur, 1995). 
  
  




The 2006 expense claims crisis at the University of Geneva was chosen as a case study for 
several reasons. First, the institution has traditionally enjoyed a solid reputation, both 
academically and in the public eye. Thus, the public expects a certain rectitude from this 
institution. Second, this crisis had serious consequences that damaged the institution, leading 
to the resignation of its executive board and to legislative reform that was not completed until 
the end of 2008. The fact that the crisis was recent and received such strong media coverage, 
along with the numerous analyses and commentaries that came from the main ‘actors’ 
involved in the crisis, make for a wealth of documentation on the topic. Finally, the case 
study demonstrates how an initial problem or incident can escalate because of failures on 
management’s part to adequately identify and address the matters at hand, including a lack of 
effective communication. 
 
In terms of communication, several important issues can be identified. There was wide 
discrepancy between the rumours and hypotheses that circulated and the real situation in this 
case. Therefore, the events are only partially responsible for the major crisis the institution 
eventually faced; instead, it was the lack of reaction to the events, the lack of 
acknowledgement of the events, and the attitude adopted by the university authorities as the 
crisis unfolded that fuelled the crisis. 
 
Two types of data were used in carrying out this research: data on the events that took place 
and data on the media communications surrounding it. For the chronology of events, the 
following documents were consulted and analysed: 
 
1. Official documents and reports: audit reports and the report on the general inquiry into the 
University; 
2. Official communications: press releases from the University of Geneva, the department of 
education, and the chancellery of the state of Geneva during the period under 
investigation. 
 
In terms of media communications, given the large quantity of articles, programmes, and 
programme sequences devoted to this topic, we limited ourselves to the main media that were 
accessible and that played a determining role in the crisis, namely articles published in the 
following newspapers: 
 
• La Tribune de Genève, the main regional daily for Geneva; 
• Le Temps, a supra-regional daily reference newspaper; and 
• Le Matin and Le Matin Dimanche, respectively a daily and a Sunday paper along the lines 
of a tabloid. 
 
La Tribune is the main daily newspaper in Geneva, while Le Temps, Le Matin, and Le Matin 
Dimanche cover the entire French-speaking region of Switzerland. Since this crisis took place 
mainly in Geneva, and since it was situated within a context of similar affairs also revealed in 
the state of Geneva, we did not analyse any articles that appeared in newspapers in the rest of 
French-speaking Switzerland or any German or Italian language papers. 
 
Although there was radio, television and internet coverage of the events, they were not the 
sources that disclosed the information and therefore were not included in the analysis. Each 
time the topic was covered in one of the newspapers used for the study, we considered it a 
contribution, whether it took the form of an article, an editorial, an interview, an analysis, or a 
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commentary. This basic breakdown was influenced neither by the length and content of the 
publication nor by its position in the paper. 
 
The period of analysis extended from April 9, 2006 to December 31, 2008. The publications 
were collected from Lexis Nexis electronic databases and from the archives of the Tribune de 
Genève website. 
 
During the period of the crisis itself (from April 9, 2006, to February 8, 2007), a total of 92 
publications either covered or made reference to the topic. After this period (from February 9, 
2007, to December 31, 2008), a total of 25 publications referred to the crisis. 
 
3. Description of the University of Geneva crisis 
 
3.1 Structure of the crisis 
Scholars have created many classification schemes for crises (see An & Cheng, 2010; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Egelhoff & Sen, 1992; Marcus, 1991; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; 
Zaremba, 2010). These typologies consider a variety of dimensions, e.g. internal-external, 
violent-nonviolent, severe-normal damage, technical-sociopolitical failure, concrete-diffuse 
victims, and objective-subjective.  
 
The expense claims crisis at the University of Geneva is unique because it was caused 
primarily by the extremely poor management of the misdeeds and how they were 
communicated, as well as by the resulting dynamics between the university and the media. 
Because it was not a case involving an accident or a natural catastrophe – both of which make 
it necessary not only to communicate about the event but also to manage the event itself in 
order to limit the consequences or the number of victims – we therefore propose a structure 
for this crisis that consists of three distinct phases: 
 
• Crisis development: the crisis began with the revelation by the press of financial 
irregularities within the university. It got fully underway when, through political 
intervention, legal action was requested. 
• The acute phase: over the following weeks, a series of new events were revealed, each 
interpreted as being more serious than the other. The university no longer had any control 
over the information. The press imposed its agenda. This phase ended with the crisis 
coming to a head when basically all of the elements that created the scandal had been 
exposed and, as the ultimate consequence, the executive board resigned en masse. 
• The recovery phase: media interest waned and the university regained control over the 
communications agenda. The crisis ended with the conclusions from the general inquiry 
into the university, which shed light on the whole affair. The case was closed. 
 
3.2 Crisis development 
The crisis developed between April and July 2006. Until the submission of the report on the 
general inquiry into the university, media coverage during this period revealed not only the 
extent of the university’s organisational and institutional dysfunctions but also the fact that 
the university’s governing bodies had been aware of the situation for quite some time. This 
revelation emphasised the lack of reaction on the part of these bodies and this, in spite of the 
various reports that had been written much earlier. 
 
In September 1996, as part of a general audit of the state of Geneva accepted by popular vote, 
a first audit4
 
 dealing with the activities of university staff revealed a lack of transparency and 
called for more accountability. This recommendation was not implemented, however.  
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In October 2001, aware of a certain number of transgressions by the university’s 
management, the administrative director wrote his own report, denouncing their dysfunctions. 
The rector did not send the document to the administrative service of the department of 
education or to the financial inspection agency for the state. The minister of education in 
office at the time of the crisis found out about the report in April 2006. 
 
In October 2003, the university’s administrative director ordered an investigatory audit to be 
carried out by a second consulting firm,5 without the knowledge of the executive board. 
Serious irregularities regarding expense claims were brought to the fore by the audit report 
(hereafter referred to as audit 04/01). The rector at the time of the crisis, who had had the 
report since the beginning of 2004, filed the document without having read it. The 
administrative director then ordered an audit from the same firm, focusing on the 
reimbursement of fees6
 
 (hereafter referred to as audit 04/02). The report was sent to the 
state’s financial inspection agency, and then, at the end of 2005, to the head of university 
affairs at the department of education, who forgot to inform the minister. 
The development of the crisis 
At the beginning of April 2006, the press obtained the special 04/02 audit report held by the 
financial inspection agency for the state. The April 9 edition of Matin Dimanche exposed the 
case of a penal denunciation and presented several examples of irregular expense claims. 
When asked to comment on the report, the minister of education denounced this type of 
practice, stating, however, that it was “reassuring that the university itself had mandated a 
fiduciary to shed light on the actions it suspected”. 
  
The crisis begins 
On April 10, 2006 Le Temps and La Tribune de Genève also published the story. The rector 
was quoted in both newspapers. He downplayed not only the extent of the irregularities but 
also their significance. He assured people that the situation was under control and criticised 
the media’s attitude: “I’ve noticed that the media attention we receive focuses on this type of 
affair. They are paying more attention to the university now than if one of our professors had 
won the Nobel Prize.” 
 
On April 13, La Tribune de Genève published an analysis of the contents of the report: 
“There is one word to describe the university’s accounting policies: amateurish.” The 
institution’s financial management as a whole was portrayed as being both imprecise and 
illegal.  
 
In the April 15 edition of Le Matin several political and economic personalities criticised the 
flippant nature of the executive board’s reaction regarding the irregularities and questioned its 
claim of having taken the necessary measures on its own. 
 
On April 20, the minister revealed to the public prosecutor the case brought to his attention 
by the rector in March, revealing at the same time all of the situations that might constitute 
penal offences. Four more cases were revealed. He also sent a letter to the rector, requesting 
that he “hasten to order a new audit to be done by a fiduciary7
 
, on travel and hospitality 
expenses for the 2005 fiscal year in order to determine the effectiveness of the new system 
implemented after 2004”. 
On April 22, following the publication of the report for 2004 by the state’s financial 
inspection agency, the newspapers discovered that it was not a matter of one isolated case but 
that five cases had been exposed and that the irregularities were widespread and recurrent 
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throughout the institution. The attitude and lack of firmness on the part of the rector were 
once again vehemently criticised by the media.  
 
The acute crisis 
On April 24, after an in-depth analysis of the contents of the report by the state’s financial 
inspection agency and a demand for further information from the university, the executive 
board brought the 04/01 audit report to the minister’s attention. Among other things, this 
report mentioned irregularities regarding incidental earnings for teaching staff, the use of 
private funds to finance salary top-ups, and the repurchasing of contingency payments.  
On April 26, the state government decided to launch a general inquiry into the University of 
Geneva. This inquiry was to be carried out by a former minister and public prosecutor from 
state another Swiss state.  
 
By April 28, the press was aware of the 04/01 audit report, and the affair became a true 
scandal. Le Matin ran the title, “University: Panic on board”, and following the discovery of 
an incriminating audit that had until then been “hidden” from political entities and the launch 
of a general inquiry, asked “just where the fraud scandal at the University of Geneva [would] 
end up”. Rather than organising a “witch hunt” to find out who had exposed the problem, the 
rector took responsibility and offered to resign. The government asked him to keep his 
position, declaring that it still had full confidence in him. Dogged by relentless reporters, the 
rector announced that the university’s management had decided to no longer comment on the 
affair. 
 
Although the executive board had indicated a few days earlier that it would no longer 
comment on the affair, some executives of the University continued to speak with the press. 
On May 11, the university appointed a communications expert, who was promptly 
interviewed by Le Matin: “The university refuses to comment. Is this a good strategy? […] 
before communicating with the outside, it is necessary to be strong on the inside […] 
otherwise communications go every which way”. The same day the office of the public 
prosecutor decided that the events were serious enough to justify opening a preliminary penal 
investigation into false receipts, fraud, abuse of authority, and disloyal management of public 
interests. 
 
On May 13, Le Matin raised questions about the circumstances under which the 04/01 and 
04/02 audits were carried out, as well as about their conclusions. The university still refused 
to comment. The newspaper turned to anonymous sources: “A state grant was allegedly 
misappropriated […] to pay salary top-ups! According to our sources, more than 700,000 
francs8
 
 are involved in the affair, and the misappropriated funds were meant to be used for 
AIDS research.” 
On May 17, the minister of education sent the 04/01 and 04/02 audit reports to all members 
of parliament of the state of Geneva.  
 
On May 18, the parliament postponed two projects modifying measures regarding incidental 
expenses in the law on the university, as well as the creation of a new institute until the 
September 2006 parliamentary session.  
 
On May 19, a headline in Le Matin read, “University in a shambles! … The audit hidden by 
the university has finally surfaced. The evidence is damning”. The press obtained the 04/01 
audit and revealed the scandal in its entirety. Not only was the abuse alarming in terms of 
numbers, but it also appeared to be widespread and recurrent, and it seemed that the 
department of education had known about it since the autumn of 2003. The minister of 
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education in office at the time of the audit also spoke out. She defended herself by saying that 
she had never been lax in her management of problems.  
 
On June 30, the intermediate report for the general inquiry into the university was submitted 
to the state government, which decided to communicate only the main points, “in order not to 
compromise the administrative and penal inquiries”. The report noted a “slackening 
discipline” amongst some professors and a very vague form of management in the institution 
as a whole. Following the findings of the intermediate report, the state government decided to 
extend the inquirer’s mandate to November 30, 2006. “The university’s governance being the 
most serious problem and the one most urgently in need of being resolved”, it decided to 
create an external committee to write a draft for the law on the university. 
 
All of the daily papers had something to say. Le Matin ran the following headline: 
“University: sweep-up job on the horizon”. Le Temps noted that the affair no longer 
resembled the “isolated management problem that the rector spoke of recently”. The so-
called expense claims scandal and other accounting aberrations have brought to light a 
situation that is concerning enough to warrant a full-scale reform by the state government. 
The primary conclusions of the accounting audit for 2005 carried out upon the request of the 
minister of education on April 20, 2006, would bring to light certain irregularities committed 
by management. The case was deemed important enough to be communicated to the public 
prosecutor before the conclusion of the audit. In reaction to these suspicions, the entire 
executive board resigned in copore on July 11. 
 
Recovery 
Following the executive board’s resignation, the government of Geneva had to appoint an 
interim management team. On July 26 and 27, Le Temps and La Tribune de Genève 
commented on the state government’s choices. A former dean of the university was appointed 
rector for 10 months. The new management team and the minister of education tried to sound 
reassuring: “We have found a gem from the inner circle.” La Tribune de Genève ran the 
following headline: “The new head of the university comes with a scandal-free guarantee”. A 
former federal minister and president of the confederation was appointed head of the 
committee in charge of reforming the university. 
 
In September 2006, as the executive board ad interim began the new university term, the 
interim rector reiterated the team’s ambitious objectives in La Tribune de Genève and Le 
Temps: “I expect a heightened sense of responsibility from all of my colleagues while they 
are under my authority. Every franc allocated to the institution must be a good investment”. 
The new rector and his team first promised efficient and transparent management, as well as 
“absolute discipline” within the university.  
 
On December 20, 2006, a new rector was appointed; he was to take office on July 15, 2007. 
The candidate, a member of the “inner circle”, was the former vice-rector and former vice-
dean of the university. In Le Temps and La Tribune de Genève, the minister of education 
explained that the Geneva state government had opted for “caution” and “solidity”. For his 
part, the soon-to-be rector stated that the situation was far from being catastrophic and that 
the institution was well on its way to recovering: “There is no denying that there are 
difficulties, but there are other elements to consider: the teaching and research at the 
university are of a very high quality”.  
 
On January 17, 2007, the final report on the general inquiry into the university was submitted 
to the state government. Its conclusions minimised the extent of the fraud, but deplored the 
university’s management dysfunctions, stating that the school’s governance systems must be 
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entirely revised. The report also shed light upon the content, execution, and transmission of 
the various successive audits, indicating that the total amount of the fraud was in the region 
of 10,000 Swiss francs.9
 
 The irregularities highlighted by the various audits were mostly 
administrative in nature, due to negligence, a lack of discipline, and, in exceptional cases, a 
desire for illegitimate enrichment. Only two of the penal denunciations were held by the 
judge for further investigation. The report states that no intentions to deceive or to gain 
wealth had been established. The vice-rector whose alleged implication had led to the fall of 
the executive board was exonerated; the case against her was dismissed by the public 
prosecutor’s office at the end of the month. 
Post-crisis 
On November 30, 2008, the new law, which provided the university with more autonomy in 
terms of political power and strengthened the executive board, was passed by popular vote 
with an overwhelming 72% majority of Geneva’s population voting in its favour. 
 
4. Analysis of the characteristics of crisis communication 
 
As explained earlier in this article, the situation described in section 3 has most of the main 
characteristics of what constitutes a crisis. We will not attempt to identify and analyse all of 
these characteristics here, but we will illustrate the main ones. 
 
Interference from multiple players 
This is one of the characteristics that make crises very difficult to manage: whether actively 
or just in response to media requests, many different people will express their opinions about 
the crisis or connected topics (Seitel, 1983). In this case, the players included several 
university governing bodies (the executive board, administrative management, the university 
senate), the university staff, the minister of teaching and research, several other state 
ministers, members of parliament, rectors of other universities, and others. 
 
With so many people involved, it is easy to find contradictory remarks or to reveal some 
particular aspect that had perhaps been forgotten before. In a crisis situation, statements 
expressed by these various players often carry more weight than the official statements 
coming from the organisation itself, particularly if the organisation has lost some of its 
credibility. It is therefore crucial that the organisation be beyond reproach in terms of 
communication, so that its voice will continue to be heard and so that it can serve as a 
reference for the media, at least when it comes to establishing the facts: “By appointing one 
spokesperson, to handle all communication, an organization refrains from releasing confusing 
message from many sources” (Pinsdorf, 1987, p. 43). For this reason, it is important to 
always repeat the facts as they are known, to stick to them, to invalidate any statements that 
are not true, and to try to set the following guideposts for communication (Clampitt, 1991; 
Garvin, 1996). In the absence of these elements, it is the statements made by other players 
that will be repeated by the media and assimilated by the population as truth. In these cases, 
the media reveals the information without identifying its sources. 
 
Exteriority in crisis management 
The pace of any crisis is generally dictated by a series of events as the drama unfolds, and the 
organisation concerned often has no choice but to adapt to this pace, as well as to that of the 
media, as it tries to avoid any dissonance, e.g. by respecting a certain grieving time for 
families before entering into heated debates. In the case of crises that are more specifically 
related to the disclosure of information, it is the nature of the information that dictates the 
pace of the crisis if the organisation has lost control over how it is conveyed (see Robertson, 
2012). 
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION REVIEW, 2(1) – 2012  
25 
 
The crisis at the University of Geneva stemmed mainly from the fact that the institution’s 
governing bodies only partially acknowledged the existence and the importance of the 
criticisms being made and, moreover, failed to manage the flow of information concerning 
them. It is even quite likely that, had the university made public all of the reports that it had 
in its possession and provided a list of measures it intended to take to remedy existing 
dysfunctions, the crisis would not have reached the same scale and would have been over in a 
matter of days or weeks. This would have made sense, particularly since the university could 
have guessed that the media either already had or would eventually have access to the reports 
in question. When we examine how the crisis unfolded, it is evident that it is the information 
that appeared in the media that dictated the pace of the crisis, at least up to the end of the 
acute phase (the resignation of the executive board). An example that supports this was the 
executive board’s decision to no longer comment on the crisis until the submission of the 
independent expert’s report – a decision that the executive board itself could not uphold due 
to the articles published in the meantime and to the necessity of providing basic information 
or commenting on other information. 
 
Once the recovery phase was underway, we can see that the university once again took over 
the management of most of the communications; articles about the dysfunctions, other than as 
part of official communiqués, became rare. The proactive nature of the communications, the 
more technical and responsible tone they took on, and the renewal of confidence in the 
academic authorities – i.e., the new executive board – explain this reversal to a large extent. 
 
Disturbance in the normal way of functioning 
One characteristic of a crisis is that it affects the entire organisation, not only the departments 
or individuals directly involved (Fearn-Banks, 2007). Furthermore, the whole organisation is 
influenced by the pace of the crisis and no longer functions by the same procedures, norms, 
or habits to which it is accustomed. 
 
In the case of the University of Geneva (although it may be difficult to examine this aspect 
through the articles that appeared in the press) the entire organisation and all of its associates 
were affected by the crisis, which occupied the minds of individuals in the institution and 
impacted all of its activities. For example, the creation of a faculty of environmental science 
and sustainable development, which was to be made into an institute, was put on hold by the 
ministry in charge for the duration of the crisis. Another example can be found in an excerpt 
from an article published in the May 5 edition of Le Temps: “A probe into several faculties 
reveals a general sense of unease. All professors interviewed by Le Temps speak of a heavy 
and unpleasant atmosphere that is rife with suspicion. Some faculties have organised crisis 
meetings to defuse nascent controversies”. 
 
The lumping together of criticisms  
In a crisis, the lumping together of facts, rumours, and hypotheses, and the absence of any 
hierarchy or structure in terms of the critical events, contribute to people’s sense of 
uncertainty and to the arrival of new players on the scene (Coombs, 2007a; Ulmer et al., 
2007). For example, it is interesting to note that some very different problems were placed 
under the same general label of “dysfunctions”: false expense claims of a penal nature, the 
disregard of rules for filing expense claims, the retrocession of incidental earnings, the 
university’s payments to guarantee the professional contingency of certain professors, the 
financing of doctoral students hired with the national fund for scientific research, and so on. 
Although dysfunctions may have been observed in most of the cases, the causes, players, and 
implications were different each time. Similarly, the seriousness of the offences are also often 
lumped together. It is not the same thing to file a false expense claim, e.g. by passing off 
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personal expenses as professional ones or by falsifying documents, as it is to disregard 
administrative norms when filing a normal expense claim, e.g. by failing to sign or have 
documents stamped, having payments that exceed authorised amounts, failing to include 
proof of payment, etc.. The first case is a penal offence concerning one person who has 
misappropriated funds for private use, whereas the second case is a matter of administrative 
problems (violation of rules, vague and easy-to-ignore rules, absence of rules, etc.). The 
problem is therefore an administrative one and requires not a judicial decision but a more 
professional management of affairs at the administrative level. 
 
However, as crises are characterised by the predominance of emotions over facts, the facts 
themselves are not structured; all misdeeds or errors are placed on the same level, which of 
course generally increases the scope of the crisis and the reactions of those who have been 
unjustly attacked.  
 
The discovery of similar events in other institutions 
One element observed in many crises is that they can be intensified by the discovery of 
similar events in other organisations, or by updates on similar situations already known to the 
public (Libaert, 2001; Revéret & Moreau, 1997); it is as if it were not a matter of isolated 
events, but rather of a series of events, a widespread behaviour, or a characteristic of the 
system itself. 
 
Several similar affairs were brought to light in the Geneva region around the same time 
period. On May 22, 2006, a candidate for mayoral of Geneva was accused of abuse of 
authority in the case of several dozen cancelled parking fines. Around the same time, 
suspicious expense claims were discovered in the police force, and accounting irregularities 
were found at the authorisations and patents office. On May 29, Le Temps ran this headline: 
“A tarnished image for Geneva the scandalous”. The article also made links to an affair that 
had made the headlines in 2005. A disciplinary inquiry had been launched against two 
members of the Geneva city council for the disloyal management of public interests and false 
receipts. The city allegedly lost up to 25 million Swiss francs10 in the affair.11
 
 Given that, 
during the same period, a professor of medicine at the University of Lausanne had been 
denounced for the misappropriation of several million francs for the private purchase of art 
books, it is easy to see how many citizens – either unable or unwilling to make the effort to 
differentiate between individual and collective behaviours, fraud and dysfunction, and 
specific cases and system management – would get the impression that their public 
administration had little respect for rules, or even that it was arrogant and corrupt. 
Development of rumours and hypotheses in the absence of facts  
As the specific facts are often not known at the beginning of a crisis (the circumstances or 
causes of an accident are often not known, all the information is not always available, etc.), 
there is a very high risk that rumours will spread and hypotheses will be formulated, 
particularly since the media abhors a vacuum and cannot tolerate the absence of plausible 
explanations. Communication also needs to be proactive and clear to avoid rumours and 
speculation (see Xenou & Sánchez, 2008). When there is no information offered by the 
organisation, the media will seek opinions, ideas about the causes of the crisis, and other 
input from a wide array of experts, individuals who know the organisation, or other people 
who feel that they have something legitimate to say, such as political leaders or the heads of 
civil society organisations. This is what the media did in this case, especially after the 
university refused to continue commenting on the situation. 
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5. Analysis of communication errors 
 
While it is almost always impossible to prevent a crisis from emerging and developing, the 
violation of certain basic rules can lead to errors that aggravate and prolong the crisis and that 
undermine the credibility of those involved in it. In particular, Robertson empirically 
demonstrates that withholding information leads to “more media coverage, keeping negative 
information longer in play and raising the odds of reputational damage” (2012, p. 15). From a 
symbolic perspective, crisis-response strategies should seek to protect the organisational 
image (Coombs & Holladay, 2010; Dionisopoulos & Vibbert, 1988). 
 
Identification of the crisis and underestimation of the risks 
Crises are symbolic as well as objective (Coombs, 2007a). Although it is relatively easy to 
identify the risk of a crisis emerging in cases concerning catastrophes, serious accidents, or 
major incidents, it is not always so for situations in which the crisis stems from successive 
disclosures of information. Several elements should have alerted university authorities to the 
risk of a crisis in this case, however, including: 
 
• The institution’s reputation: The University of Geneva recently celebrated its 450th 
anniversary, and the institution is renowned, both nationally (having the second largest 
student population in Switzerland) and internationally. The greater an institution’s 
renown, particularly in the case of public institutions, the more likely are the media and 
the population to be interested in problems concerning it. 
• The university authorities knew of the existence of the reports and the dysfunctions: the 
chances of such documents being given to the media either officially or surreptitiously 
were very high, as many examples illustrate. In such a case, the institution must assume 
that this type of document or this information may be made public at any time. 
• Similar affairs had surfaced a few weeks earlier and had been the subject of intense media 
coverage: for example, the former mayor of Geneva had admitted to cancelling fines that 
he had received, and the question of the legality of this action was the subject of an 
inquiry.  
• Questions concerning wrongfully paid benefits, regardless of their value, are always 
likely to spark the interest of the media and its readers or listeners. These topics are in fact 
covered by the media on a regular basis. 
 
There is, of course, no way to be certain that a crisis is imminent, but the organisation must 
be able to analyse the risk of a crisis developing and act accordingly, which was evidently not 
done in this case. 
 
Refusing to comment 
Watzlawick’s famous maxim, “one cannot not communicate”, also applies to crisis situations 
because every action and attitude is interpreted as a form of communication. Non-
communication therefore conveys a message that can be interpreted in many different ways 
(Coombs, 2007a; Ulmer et al., 2007). 
 
This is a classic and extremely harmful error because in crises the silence of the main player 
is almost always compensated for by the voices of other players or quite simply by the media 
itself (Coombs, 2007a; Fearn-Banks, 2007). To think that an absence of communication will 
lead to a loss of interest by the media is a serious mistake because this type of situation 
encourages the development of hypotheses and rumours, tends to increase media pressure for 
more information, and can be perceived by the public as being problematic (Horsley & 
Barker, 2002; Libaert, 2001; Zaremba, 2010), particularly when the matter concerns a public 
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institution, which is accountable to the public. Frohlichstein (1998), for example, suggests 
that by responding quickly to the media, an organisation demonstrates both that it is 
concerned and that it is open with the public. 
 
In the University of Geneva crisis case, during an April 28 interview with La Tribune de 
Genève and following a decision of the state government to call for an administrative inquiry, 
the rector stated, “We have decided to no longer comment on this topic”, at least until the 
release of the inquiry’s results, scheduled for June 30. This decision also applied to the deans 
of faculties, who were given corresponding orders. This silence, which was actually broken 
by the rector on June 2, created more problems than it solved: 
 
• The media came up with its own hypotheses: faced with an absence of information, and 
since rumours implicated a member of the executive board, La Tribune de Genève raised 
suspicions in an article published on May 4 about a vice-rector who had previously been 
the dean of the faculty of medicine. The suspicions were later dropped, but since the 
executive board was not commenting on the situation, the vice-rector in question did not 
have the chance to invalidate these hypotheses. 
• The field was filled by other players. It is interesting to note that, although the rector had 
just announced that he would no longer comment on the topic until June 30, it was a 
member of the executive board who accepted an interview with La Tribune de Genève on 
May 4, stating, “I have already told him [i.e., the rector] that he should stop exposing 
himself. He could have sent those responsible to the front, and he can find as many as he 
wants. We have no lack of proof. Everything is documented”. Not only did the lack of 
collegiality amongst members of the executive board decrease its credibility (for the 
administrative director also expressed his opinions independently), but the comments also 
encouraged members of the media to increase their search for more information, knowing 
now that there was documented proof. In fact, they went on to gather information from 
anonymous sources, which added to the confusion. 
 
Several other people also expressed their opinions during this period: professors from the 
university who were concerned about the situation, members of parliament who had solutions 
to propose, etc. All of these opinions fuelled the media debate, but there was no official 
position to frame the statements in any way. 
 
Denying facts and concealing documents (denial and lies) 
Crises often take on a particularly serious tone when the main players deny the facts at the 
beginning (Coombs, 2007a; Elmasry & Chaudhri, 2010; Fearn-Banks, 2007; Marcus, 1991; 
Zaremba, 2010). Take, for example, the case of the fire in the Sandoz company’s 
Schweizerhalle factory in 1986, which allegedly led to a large number of toxins spilling into 
the Rhine River. The heads of the company first denied this [“there is nothing there”], then 
tried to remove the blame from themselves [“there is something there, but we didn’t do it”]. 
This type of action is catastrophic in terms of crisis communication because the trust is 
broken between the organisation and the various sectors of the target public. For 
communication to have the desired effect there must at least be a minimum of trust between 
the parties concerned. 
 
Of course, there was not a complete denial of the facts in the University of Geneva affair, but 
there were lies of omission. The executive board was completely aware of the various reports, 
but only acknowledged their existence as, one by one, they were revealed to the public. This 
type of action is perceived by the media and the general population as lying, which seriously 
compromises the credibility of the institution’s governing body. 
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Downplaying the significance of exposed events  
Without going as far as to deny the facts, many people are tempted to downplay them or their 
significance, which can be counter-productive since this type of attitude can reinforce 
people’s impression that the institution does not care about citizens’ concerns (see Augustine, 
1995). In this case, university authorities, and sometimes political authorities as well, tried 
this tactic often. 
 
When Le Matin published its first article on April 9, the rector acknowledged the problem, 
but downplayed it at the same time, saying, “The report doesn’t tarnish the university’s 
reputation”, and “It is only a matter of a few hundred francs”. These remarks were not very 
credible because in the same article, the newspaper revealed that the report it had obtained 
spoke of abuse in approximately 25% of expense claims. Furthermore, these same remarks 
were repeated in articles published throughout the crisis each time a new element was 
revealed. The rector implicitly acknowledged this erroneous assessment because in an 
interview that was printed in the June 2 edition of La Tribune de Genève, he stated, 
“Universities have an ethical role to play […]. Minor theft is unacceptable in this context. 
Even if it doesn’t happen often, it’s more serious than when it occurs elsewhere”.  
 
This attempt to downplay the extent of the dysfunctions and misdeeds was already prevalent 
before the crisis began because the deanship of a faculty that was concerned wrote the 
following statement: “[…] and incidentally concern amounts which actually seem quite 
modest” and “[…] that a more rigorous approach would go against the principle of 
proportionality regarding other cases of which the faculty and executive board are aware”. 
These excerpts published in the media reinforced people’s impression that the university had 
a specific notion of the seriousness of the errors committed, as compared to errors committed 
by other institutions. The communication of blame and responsibility has been much 
discussed in the literature, and it has been argued for example that the apology is a common 
element of crisis communication (Bovée & Thill, 1998; Cain, 1997; Tyler, 1997; Yagoda, 
1990). If a company is at fault, its spokespersons repair the company’s reputation much faster 
if they apologize, accept responsibility and show remorse” (Horsley & Barker, 2002, p. 409). 
 
Neglecting internal communication 
Among those who are affected by a crisis are the institution and its associates. They are asked 
by their families, friends, and colleagues to express their opinions about the criticisms being 
made of their institution (Zaremba, 2010). As in the case being examined here, they can also 
sometimes be suspected of having taken advantage of the system themselves. 
 
Although it is very difficult – impossible even – to inform the institution’s associates ahead 
of time, since the pace of the crisis is set mostly by the media and its revelations, relations 
between authorities and their associates seem to be characterised by a total lack of 
communication; this leads to a sense of disappointment and frustration (Mucchielli, 1993) 
and to a desire to express opinions—particularly in people who are accustomed to speaking to 
the media and who have many media and political contacts. Many of these individuals will 
express their opinions either personally or anonymously, such as the professor of medicine, 
for example, who stated on May 5, “everyone knew there were accounting dysfunctions”. 
That same day, La Tribune de Genève wrote: “Several professors are expressing their 
dissatisfaction and are commenting on the affair anonymously”. 
 
Attacking the media 
Scholars have demonstrated how media naturally feature selected aspects in presenting a 
story (Yioutas & Segvic, 2003). Members of the population who are at the receiving end of 
these stories will focus on these emphasised factors (Druckman, 2001). Although the media 
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can at times appear to be insistent, intrusive, and even aggressive, particularly in the case of a 
crisis, trying to distract the media by placing either part or all of the blame on it, or by 
directly or indirectly judging the quality of the work it does, should be avoided; this type of 
behaviour tends to create tension in the institution’s relationship with the media and only 
incites the media to increase its research efforts.  
 
Several remarks made by the academic and political authorities in this case went along these 
lines: 
 
• “The fact that there are irregularities is shocking […] but I’ve noticed that the attention 
we receive from the media tends to focus on this type of affair”. (Statement from the 
rector on 10.04.06); 
• “Nothing is hidden; it’s the press that didn’t see anything”. (Remark made by the 
executive councillor for the department following a reporter’s question regarding the fact 
that he had known about the report in 2003 but didn’t disclose the information until 
2006.) 
 
Seeking vindication and laying blame 
In the midst of a crisis, particularly when no one has an overall view of the information that 
exists or of the consequences of the crisis, it is important that the institution avoid laying 
blame too early on, even if it is tempting to transfer media pressure elsewhere. It is very 
likely that such remarks will eventually be proven false, which reduces the credibility of the 
person who has made the accusations. Furthermore, strong leadership is usually important 
during a crisis –leadership which inspires confidence and reduces the sense of uncertainty 
other players may feel. 
 
Examples from university or political authorities could once again be cited, but this behaviour 
was also observed amongst the university’s professors at the very beginning of the crisis. On 
April 15, the president of the university senate (assembly of professors) denounced “the 
paperwork connected with the filing of expense claims” and one professor stressed that “by 
increasing monitoring, we also increase the risk of skulduggery”. These types of remarks, 
which downplay the seriousness of the events and, moreover, place the blame for errors 
(some of which were later clearly denounced as being penal offences) on the system does not 
promote the resolution of the crisis. 
 
Word choice 
It has been claimed that “[c]ommunication is irreversible” (Zaremba, 2010, p. 71). During a 
crisis, and particularly at the beginning, a few misplaced words can be enough to increase 
tensions, especially since these words will often be systematically repeated as key reference 
points by various people. The words chosen by the rector when he said, “It’s only a matter of 
a few hundred francs”; “The affair is preposterous”; “Professors should learn to restrain 
themselves”; “It is a report that makes the university grow in stature”; “But we are part of the 
civil service. And this person did not commit any errors in the strict sense of his scientific 
work. It isn’t as if the person in question had cheated on a scientific publication”, and so on, 
are the types of remarks that would go on to be the subject of numerous criticisms and on 
which the media and other various individuals would base themselves afterwards. It is these 
remarks that were later used as reference points to judge the university’s ability to admit the 
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6. Practical applications 
 
Horsley and Barker give recommendations on how to proceed during crisis events, saying: 
“after a crisis occurs, prompt, concerted communication stops rumours and speculation; using 
the media to diffuse information is a key element in maintaining good public relations. 
Resolving the crisis in an ethical and human manner is crucial” (2002, p. 416). Several 
lessons concerning the governance of public organisations, crisis management, and crisis 
communication can be learned from this case study. 
 
In terms of governance, public organisations work in a complex environment in which they 
are increasingly obliged to be accountable, not only to their regulatory authorities (vertical 
accountability), but also to an increasing number of players with no hierarchical power 
(horizontal accountability) (see Zaremba, 2010). For reasons that are mainly linked to 
governance (lack of clarity concerning power relations between the executive board and the 
administrative management; lack of clear rules; varied interpretations of existing rules; lack 
of authority in the application of the rules; a value system in conflict with other public 
administrations; the competence required to manage such an institution; etc.), the university 
was not able to manage the different events and problems in a thoughtful and professional 
manner. If it had, the crisis would not have happened. By implementing a legislative revision 
process, finally approved by popular vote, the political authorities learned a clear lesson from 
this crisis and gave the university a modern framework with which to manage this type of 
organisation. 
 
A second lesson specific to this type of crisis, in which crisis management coincides with 
crisis communication, concerns the absence of any relationship between the objective 
seriousness of the events and the scope of the crisis. While some major dysfunctions were 
noted, revealing a certain laxity in the university’s administrative and financial management, 
only one case ended up being judged as a penal offence. It is therefore not the seriousness of 
events that provoked the crisis, but rather the lack of seriousness with which they were 
treated and followed up upon during the years leading up to the crisis, as well as the attitude 
of university authorities when it was all brought to the attention of the public. When a crisis 
does not stem from an accident or a serious incident, the management of events and the 
ability to communicate in a professional manner become particularly determining factors 
(Anthonissen, 2008; Coombs, 2007a; Fearn-Banks, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2009; Zaremba, 
2010). As mentioned above, the crisis would probably have been much smaller if the facts 
had been communicated immediately and if their importance had not been downplayed. 
 
Crises function under a type of logic that is completely different from that to which 
organisations are accustomed, and organisations must therefore be able to set up structures 
rapidly in order to deal with them. Based on the documents studied, the university does not 
seem to have been able to recognise the crisis as it developed, or to respond with appropriate 
structures. On the contrary, the role of the media was underestimated, contradictions cropped 
up within the institution itself, the institution very quickly lost control of the pace of 
communications, and so on. In this type of situation, the crisis could only worsen and lead to 
the resignation of the executive board. There are certain rules to be followed, such as 
acknowledging the particular nature of the crisis; implementing structures and processes 
specific to the crisis; and adapting the tone, pace, and content of communication (Coombs, 
2007a; 2007b; Horsley & Barker, 2002). These are not new lessons but they are worth 
repeating. 
 
Finally, an organisation cannot afford to not communicate (Coombs, 2007a; Seigenthaler et 
al., 2008; Ulmer et al., 2007). In the University of Geneva’s case, the institution found itself 
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faced with the dilemma of either communicating, and thereby revealing potentially harmful 
information, or not communicating, thereby running the risk of having the information 
transmitted to the media through a third party –which is what ended up happening. Especially 
when it is a public organisation that is heavily involved in the local context (the academic, 
political, social, and media elite know one another and interact on a daily basis), it essentially 
goes without saying that the information will eventually make its way into the hands of the 
media. Consequently, non-communication is not a tenable strategy. Furthermore, non-
communication leaves the doors open for other players who may not always be well-
intentioned to put forth a multitude of hypotheses, which will then be transformed by rumour 
or malevolence into accepted facts. The university should therefore have proactively revealed 
the reports it had in its possession (particularly the fiduciaries’ reports12
 
) and done its best to 
ensure an ongoing dialogue with the media (although it is true that this type of dialogue 
becomes impossible when there is a lack of mutual trust). To communicate does not 
necessarily mean to make all events immediately public (particularly if the crisis stems from 
the fact that events are out of control to begin with), but rather to ensure that the organisation 
continues to be recognised as a reliable partner in establishing the facts, assuming the 
corresponding responsibility, and finding solutions. If, however, the organisation expresses 
itself in a disorderly and contradictory fashion, and then stops expressing itself altogether, it 
can no longer assume its role with other players. 
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1  The executive board (rectorat) of the University of Geneva is composed by a rector (executive head) and 
several vice-rectors and deans. They are in charge of the general policy and strategy of the university.  
2  Consider, for example, the revelations concerning the British members of Parliament expenses scandal 
(2009). 
3  Although this crisis had important consequences at the institutional level, only a handful of the events ended 
up being treated criminally. In the end, only one ruling led to conviction; the court decided that for the rest, 
the amounts were small and had resulted from “written errors” and “lack of understanding”. The executive 
board launched four public inquiries, three of which ended without any disciplinary actions. One inquiry (the 
one linked to the penal conviction) led to disciplinary action. 
4  Andersen audit, September 1996. 
5  Special audit report 04/01 by Ernst & Young (February, 2004) 
6  Special audit report 04/02 by Ernst & Young (July, 2004) 
7  Price Waterhouse Coopers report (August, 2006). 
8  In 2006, approximately 560,000 USD 
9  In 2006, approximately 8,000 USD 
10  In 2006, approximately 20,000,000 USD 
11  This affair was referred to as the Rue du Stand affair, named for the street where a building was repurchased 
by the city of Geneva. 
12  The state of Geneva has had a law on public information and access to documents (LIPAD) since 2002. The 
type of documents in this case most certainly fell under the law’s jurisdiction, and anyone could have 
requested them from the university. 
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